Thursday, September 26, 2013

Excerpt:


The Devil Inside the Beltway: The Shocking Expose of the U.S. Government's Surveillance and Overreach into Cybersecurity, Medicine and Small Business
Trade Paperback

(Excerpt is below the book information, in bold.)
Michael J. Daugherty, author and CEO of LabMD in Atlanta, Georgia, uncovers and details an extraordinary government surveillance story that compromised national security and invaded the privacy of tens of millions of online users worldwide. Unbelievable from beginning to end, you'll be shocked at what is really going on behind every closed door in Washington. A riveting true political thriller, the pace is breathless, the arguments compelling, and the iron will of Daugherty transforms him from government prey to government whistleblower. The Devil Inside the Beltway is a compelling true story that begins when an aggressive security surveillance company, with retired General Wesley Clark on its advisory board, magically acquires the private health information of thousands of LabMD's patients. This company, Tiversa, campaigns for a "fee" from LabMD to "remedy" the problem. When Michael J. Daugherty refuses to pay, Tiversa follows up by handing the file over to the FTC. Daugherty reveals that the company was already working with Dartmouth, having received a significant portion of a $24,000,000 grant from Homeland Security, to surveil for files. The reason for the investigation was this: Peer to peer software companies have back doors built into their technology that allows for illicit and unapproved file sharing. When individual work stations are accessed, as in the case of LabMD, proprietary information can be taken. Tiversa, as part of their assignment, acquired over 14 million files, financial, medical and military data during their search. Daugherty's book documents a frighteningly systematic and dishonest investigation by one of the US Government's most important agencies. The consequences of their actions will have a chilling effect on Americans and their businesses for years.

Excerpt: 



The search told us that the only probable way someone could have come into the computer without authorization was through LimeWire. The breach occurred through a program that one employee had installed without our authorization or knowledge. A program that didn’t appear on the desktop. A program that stayed hidden from our view during inspections. How were we to know or anticipate such breaches? The questions were endless. 
Rebecca insisted she had no idea she could expose sensitive material through her computer. In fact, she said she had no idea anyone could access her computer externally; she believed she was only using the software to listen to music while she worked. Although she signed an employee handbook acknowledging that downloading software was against company policy, I did not believe she would have risked committing career suicide by being careless with patient data. 
We would one day learn that more than 450 million other computers in the world were also vulnerable. We now assumed that Rebecca’s computer was the gateway Boback used to get the file; it seemed obvious but we had no concrete proof. 
So what the hell just happened? We needed answers and we needed them now, so we turned back to Robert Boback to see how many more cards he would show in his quest to “help us out.” 

Rep. Yarmouth: Do you think that users that download P2P software applications are being tricked into sharing files that they would not ordinarily share?
Sydnor: Yes. They are inadvertently sharing files they do not intend to share. In the report we attempt to explain why, although the user does not intend that result, that result may have been intended by others. That is not a question we purport to be able to answer based on the publicly available data that we were able to review. But the short answer is yes, people are making catastrophic mistakes with these programs . . . That is also a very important part of the problem, and people who do not want to be distributors of pirated goods on these networks should be able to make that choice and have it be very easy, and right now it is simply not.1 
Thomas D. Sydnor, II, Testifying before the US House of Representatives, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, to Representative John Yarmouth, R-KY.

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